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Introduction
The majority of U.S. states today have tribal gaming enterprises,' all of
which came into existence in the last few decades. As reservation gaming
operations have expanded, these entities have been attacked on multiple
fronts-some straightforward and some more subtle. One area of major
change and significance is the gradual infringement on the tribal governmental
sphere through a redefinition of what constitutes tribal government functions.
The classification of government functions is significant for several reasons.
Primary among these is that "areas traditionally left to tribal self-government
have enjoyed an exception from the general rule that congressional
enactments, in terms applying to all persons, include Indians and their property
interests." 2 The question of what is a government function has become crucial
because of a recent push to expand increasing numbers of federal statutes and
regulations to include tribal activities. Additionally, the Supreme Court
established in Montana v. United States that the sovereignty doctrine
specifically prohibits state action that impairs the ability of a tribe to exercise
traditional government functions.' Finally, several federal statutes explicitly
exempt governmental activities from their reach.'
The definition of governmental activities has always been a shifting one.'
But with respect to the tribes, this movement has taken a path divergent from
1. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, List and Location of Tribal Gaming Operations, http://
www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/ListandLocationofTribalGamingOperations/tabid/68/Default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 14, 2009).
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co.,
986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir.
1974)).
3. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982,26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2006).
5. See Internal Revenue Service, What Are "Essential Services" or "Essential Government
Functions?," http://www.irs.gov/govt/tribes/article/0,,id=1 80911,00.html (last visitedNov. 23,
2009) (stating that, in the excise-tax context, "[e]ssential government functions are functions
that a tribal government would normally perform in its daily operation. The statutory




the definition as applied to the states and other government entities. Now,
tribal commercial activities are excluded where state commercial enterprises
are treated as governmental. This veering-off of the definition as applied to
tribes has coincided with the rise of anti-gaming sentiment, and a concern with
tribal gaming is reflected in each stage of the change. The timing and
suggestive language, combined with the fact that no Supreme Court precedent
or expression of congressional intent supports the change, indicate that the
anti-gaming movement has emboldened this narrowing. The result of this
unjustified mutation is to "derail[] tribal economic development"' and
"thwart[] the ability of the tribes to provide for their members."'
It is true that in some other contexts commercial activities have been singled
out as being non-governmental. For example, the commercial-activities
exception to foreign sovereign immunity states that when a foreign
government acts like an ordinary commercial actor, it is subject to tort
liability.! But these exceptions assume the rule-that governments do not
cease to act as governments when they engage in commercial activities for the
purpose of raising funds to provide essential services.
This comment argues that anti-gaming sentiment has fueled a mutation in
the definition of traditional tribal tribal government functions that is not
founded on congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, or logic. Part I
tracks the evolution of the governmental-functions concept as it applies to
tribes, noting the significant change that has occurred in the last twenty years,
coinciding with the widespread establishment and expansion of Indian gaming
enterprises. Part II argues that this change has resulted in significant part from
animosity toward Indian gaming, as evidenced by its timing and by language
in the cases and statutes suggesting these concerns. Part III considers possible
solutions to this problem and argues that recent controversies may present an
opportunity to return the definition to a more principled meaning.
I. The Narrowing of Tribal Government Functions
This Part tracks the evolution in the definition of tribal government
functions through court cases, congressional enactments, and agency
decisions. Section I-A examines the conception of tribal government functions
6. Ann Richard, Note, Application ofthe NationalLaborRelations Act andtheFairLabor
Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting the Economic Self-Determination of Tribes, 30 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 203, 203 (2005-2006).
7. Id. at 205.
8. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006).
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prior to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),' when tribes were treated
for the most part like other governments. Section I-B describes the second,
post-IGRA stage, where court decisions and congressional enactments began
to draw a line between governmental activities and commercial operations
performed by tribes. Section I-C then examines the recent San Manuel Indian
Bingo & Casino v. National Labor Relations Boardo decision in the District
of Columbia Circuit and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision
in Foxwoods Resort Casino," which make the final jump to rule that tribal
commercial enterprises are not traditional government activities eligible for the
privileges granted to other governments.
A. Commercial Activities Were Treated as Tribal Government Functions
Pre-IGRA
For thirty years prior to the rise of Indian gaming, the definition of tribal
government functions remained fairly consistent.12 It was assumed that tribal
commercial activities were part of the activities of government and that tribes
could regulate the on-reservation activities of non-members associated with the
tribes, even when those individuals were employees in tribal enterprises."
This definition of government functions was played out mostly in the context
of whether federal statutes of general applicability included particular tribal
activities. The approach taken was that "[c]ourts and other decision-making
bodies have traditionally been reluctant to apply statutes of general
applicability to tribes absent unequivocal evidence of congressional intent.""
Labor statutes are frequently at the center of the dispute over the application
of general statutes. During the pre-IGRA period, the NLRB "consistently held
that Indian tribes and their self-directed enterprises located on Indian
reservations were implicitly exempt, as governmental entities, from the
[National Labor Relations Act's] jurisdiction." 5 This assumption remained
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006).
10. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
11. No. 34-RC-2230 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared files/Regional%20Decisions/2007/34-RC-22 30%2010-24-07.pdf.
12. WenonaT. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REv. 691,
691 (2004).
13. See id. at 711 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981), allowing for tribal regulation of non-members involved in
consensual dealings with the tribe).
14. Richard, supra note 6, at 207 (citing Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506
(1976)).
15. Rob Roy Smith, If You Think Tribal Casinos Do Not Have to Comply with the NLRA,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/6
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in place until the Board's San Manuel decision in 2004." The earlier NLRB
decisions placed emphasis on geography, counting as governmental all those
enterprises that were based on the reservation." Those decisions founded their
reasoning on the assumption that tribal governments were to be treated like
any other governments in this context." For example, in one 1976 decision,19
"[i]n deciding not to assert jurisdiction over the enterprise, the NLRB held that
the dispositive consideration was the fact that the Indian tribe is a government,
and that government enterprises were explicitly exempted from the NLRA."20
Supreme Court decisions also supported a robust definition of tribal
government functions. In finding tribal taxing authority to be an essential
government function,2' the Court recognized the tribe as a government with the
same taxing privileges that state governments enjoy.22 That decision lends
support to the idea that other tribal activities that bring in revenue to support
government are also essential functions.2 3 Additionally, in California v.
Cabazon Band ofMission Indians,24 the major gaming decision prompting the
passage of IGRA, the Court supported gaming as an expression of tribal
sovereignty, further boosting a logical assumption that gaming operations by
tribes were inextricably linked to those tribes' self-governance.
Think Again, ADVOCATE, May 2007, at 30, 30.
16. Id.; see discussion infra Part I-C.
17. Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-Owned Businesses Are Not "Employers ": Economic
Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 43 IDAHO L.
REV. 127, 168-70 (2006).
18. Id. at 168-69.
19. Fort Apache, 226 N.L.R.B. 503.
20. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 169; see also Fort Apache, 226 N.L.R.B. at 506 (stating
that "Indian tribal governments, at least on reservation lands, are generally free from state or
even in most instances Federal intervention, unless Congress has specifically provided to the
contrary").
21. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982). "The power to tax is
an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-
government and territorial management." Id. at 137.
22. Id. at 138. "Numerous other governmental entities levy a general revenue tax similar
to that imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe when they provide comparable services. Under these
circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners to contribute through taxes
to the general cost of tribal government." Id.
23. See infra Part II-D.
24. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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B. As Gaming Picked Up, Cases and Enactments Began to Carve Out
Commercial Activities from the Governmental-Activities Sphere
As Indian gaming became more popular and more profitable, and after
Congress passed IGRA to deal with the new reality of tribal gaming, the
language regarding tribal government functions began to change. Post-IGRA
cases picked up on earlier Ninth Circuit language and began to suggest that
some commercial activities do not fit into the "government functions"
category. Additionally, the Pension Protection Act" and Indian Tribal
Government Tax Status Act," as enforced, further began to carve tribal
activities into two distinct groups: purely governmental and commercial.
Tribes began to experiment with gaming as a means of reservation
economic development in the 1970s and 1980s, and this effort attracted wide
attention. The first major victory for tribal gaming arose out of the
controversy surrounding a bingo operation on the Cabazon Band reservation
in California.17 California sought to limit the on-reservation activities to
charitable gaming in accordance with state law,28 but the Court ruled that the
gaming enterprise fell within the realm of tribal self-determination, and thus
state regulation was impermissible." This decision led to a rapid expansion
in Indian gaming.o
IGRA was passed in response to Cabazon in 1988 to provide a limiting
framework for the gaming trend." It is reasonable to infer that the Act was in
part prompted by "a fear that Indians, being free from most or all of the
constraints placed upon existing gaming activities, would have an unfair
competitive advantage against non-Indian gaming."" But still, "Congress
made clear that the purpose of the Act was to benefit Indian tribes,"" and
25. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
26. 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2006).
27. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 204-05.
28. Id. at 205.
29. Id. at 221-22.
30. James A. Davis & Lloyd E. Hudman, The History ofIndian Gaming Law and Casino
Development in the Western United States, in TOURISM AND GAMING ON AMERICAN INDIAN
LANDS 82, 84 (Alan A. Lew & George A. Van Otten eds., 1998).
31. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 39, 50 (2007) ("The Act was a compromise between the interests of Indian tribes that
had been recognized and validated by the Supreme Court and the interests of the state and local
governments.").
32. Brian M. Greene, Comment, The Reservation Gambling Fury: Modern Indian Uprising
or Unfair Restraint on Tribal Sovereignty?, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 93, 99 (1996).




IGRA contained language supporting tribal economic-development activities
as being vital to sovereignty. The asserted purpose of the Act was in part "to
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a
means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments."34 This language acknowledged the close connection
between gaming and tribal governmental activities. Additionally, IGRA
required that gaming proceeds be used for tribal governmental activities,
among five possible uses.s
1. The Ninth Circuit Frames the Category
After the passage of IGRA, several circuit courts of appeals, led by the
Ninth Circuit, began to adjust the breadth of the tribal self-government sphere.
These courts relied on what is arguably dicta from the 1960 Supreme Court
decision in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, where the
Court stated that "general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as to all
others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary."3 Although the
opinion narrowly addressed the question of whether reservation land may be
taken as part of the Power Commission's eminent-domain powers,37 courts
have interpreted this decision as creating a broad rule applying general federal
statutes to tribes." Expanding on Tuscarora, some courts have adopted a
narrow view of which tribal government activities are protected from these
statutes, concluding that statutes of general applicability include tribes unless
the situation meets one of three exceptions, with one such exception being
where the activity "touches 'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters.'" 39
The Ninth Circuit led the charge to narrow the sphere of tribal government
functions, building off its pre-IGRA Coeur d'Alene decision,' where the court
dealt with the application of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
to a farm wholly owned and operated by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In
analyzing whether the statute could extend to the Tribe's activities, the court
found that Tuscarora had established a general rule of applicability and
34. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006).
35. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v).
36. 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960).
37. Id. at i10.
38. See, e.g., Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980),
superseded by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2467, as recognized in United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996)).
40. Id.
No. 1]1 177
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articulated three exceptions to that rule.4 1 The first exception, the court said,
is that "[a] federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of
applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law touches
'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters."' 42 The
court further clarified to say, "We believe that the tribal self-government
exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as conditions
of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations . . . "'
Coeur d'Alene thus outlined and potentially limited the self-government
exception by defining it not necessarily to include all aspects of self-
government, but only including those aspects that the court finds are "purely
intramural."" The court then found that "[bjecause the Farm employs non-
Indians as well as Indians, and because it is in virtually every respect a normal
commercial farming enterprise, we believe that its operation free of federal
health and safety regulations is 'neither profoundly intramural .. .nor essential
to self-government.' "" To find that OSHA did not apply to the Farm "would
bring within the embrace of 'tribal self-government' all tribal business and
commercial activity,' presumably a result undesired by the court.
The effort of the court in Coeur d'Alene to separate out commercial
activities from self-government was somewhat strained. The court noted that
"the Tribe has the inherent sovereign right to regulate the health and safety of
workers in tribal enterprises,"' but then later argued that federal regulation of
those same enterprises does not imply "'exclusive rights of self-
governance. "'48 A 1991 case expanding on the new separation and applying
OSHA to a tribal timber mill also exhibits this inconsistency.49 The court there
recognized that the business "[was] critical to the tribal government," but in
the same sentence declined to include it within the Coeur d'Alene self-
governance exception.o
41. Id. at 1115-16.
42. Id. at 1116 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893).
43. Id.
44. Id; see also Sac & Fox Indus., Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. 241,244 (1992) (noting that courts
consider several factors in making this evaluation, including "whether the tribal enterprise is
a normal commercial enterprise operating in interstate commerce, and whether it employs non-
Indians as well as Indians").
45. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1115.
48. Id. at 1116 (quoting Farris, 624 F.2d at 893).
49. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety& Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182,





In 2004, the Ninth Circuit signaled the cementing of the commercial-
activities distinction in a case finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not
apply to tribal law-enforcement officers.s' The court gave a new elucidation
of the intramural standard, saying it is met "only in those rare circumstances
where the immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the
reservation by members of the tribe and where self-government is clearly
implicated."5 2 The opinion further made sure to "distinguish between what is
a governmental function and what is primarily a commercial one."" The court
was influenced by the fact that law enforcement does not "provide primary
benefits to persons with no interest or stake in tribal government."54 It further
stated that the fact that some employees were not tribal members is not
relevant where "all the officers work on the reservation to serve the interests
of the tribe and reservation governance."" Nowhere does the Ninth Circuit
explain why gaming would not also fulfill these criteria or why "[t]ribal law
enforcement clearly is a part of tribal government and is for that reason an
appropriate activity to exempt as intramural,"" but some activities that are
likewise run by tribal governments, such as gaming, are not.
2. Other Courts Follow the Lead
Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, "any conduct that affects interstate
commerce or involves the employment of non-Indians is not deemed to
constitute a purely intramural matter or implicate tribal self government.""
Other courts began to pick up on this view in the post-IGRA period, further
limiting the contours of the self-government sphere by helping to shrink the
category of "intramural matters."
The Second Circuit, for example, applied the Coeur d'Alene approach in a
1996 case where it found that OSHA regulated a tribal business performing
construction jobs on the reservation." The court acknowledged the
enterprise's services to the tribe, noting that "[i]ts workers assist in the
building of roads, tribal homes, and the continuing expansion of the Foxwoods
High Stakes Bingo and Casino."5 9 Despite the fact that the administrative law
51. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 896.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 895.
57. Singel, supra note 12, at 713.
58. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. Id. at 175.
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judge had found that these constituted "governmental activities of a purely
intramural nature,"o the circuit court found that the Coeur d'Alene test applied
and that the excluded category "does not include all aspects of sovereignty,"
but only a limited class of intramural matters."
The business did not fit into this class, the court said, where "it hires non-
Indians and continues to work on the construction of Foxwoods, a casino
clearly operating in interstate commerce."62 These activities, "taken together,
doom [the tribal business's] claim that its work implicates exclusive rights of
self-governance in purely intramural matters. . . . When all is said and done,
[the tribal business] is in the construction business; and its activities are of a
commercial and service character, not a governmental character."' These
factors "result in a mosaic that is distinctly inconsistent with the portrait of an
Indian tribe exercising exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters."6'
The Eleventh Circuit also adopted the Coeur d'Alene approach in a case
applying the Americans with Disabilities Act to a tribal entertainment
facility.65 The court was explicit about its exclusion of commercial activities
from the government-functions exception, finding that "tribe-run business
enterprises acting in interstate commerce do not fall under the 'self-
governance' exception to the rule that general statutes apply to Indian tribes.'
The NLRB, in its first case to integrate the Coeur d'Alene analysis, 7 gave
a list of factors for a court to use in determining whether a tribal activity fits
the Ninth Circuit's "purely intramural" exception.6 ' That list included:
[W]hether the tribal enterprise is a normal commercial enterprise
operating in interstate commerce, . . . whether it employs non-
Indians as well as Indians[,] ... whether the statute. . . would ...
usurp[] the tribe's decision-making power, ... [and] whether the
statute's effects would extend beyond the activity of the business
60. Id. at 176.
61. Id. at 179.
62. Id. at 180.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 181.
65. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999).
66. Id.
67. Sac & Fox Indus., Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. 241, 243-45 (1992).




enterprise to regulate purely intramural matters such as tribal
membership, inheritance rules, or domestic relations.6 9
This stood in stark contrast to the Board's prior decisions, which had applied
the normal governmental analysis to tribal businesses."o By this time it was
becoming apparent that "commercial enterprise[s]" were a new category of
tribal government activity and could be treated differently in this new
landscape carved out by gaming.
3. Some Courts Resist
Despite the appeal of the Ninth Circuit's flexible standard, the Tenth and
Eighth Circuits have not fully jumped onto the Coeur d'Alene bandwagon, and
their decisions suggest a different approach.7' In National Labor Relations
Board v. Pueblo ofSan Juan, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) applied to prevent the tribe from
setting labor standards in a tribal timber-lease agreement.72 The court framed
the question before it as "whether the [tribe] continues to exercise the same
authority to enact [labor standard] laws as do states and territories." The
court recognized that tribes are "'distinct, independent political
communities "'7 with governmental powers that in fact go beyond the powers
of states and thus are exempt, like other governments, from the reach of the
NLRA. 75 The tribe's authority over all economic activities occurring on the
reservation is broad' because "[1]ike states and territories, the [tribe] has a
strong interest as a sovereign in regulating economic activity involving its own
members within its own territory. "n7 Therefore, tribal regulation of the non-
member business involved in that case was 'a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty' and 'a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial
management . . . [which] derives from the tribe's general authority, as
69. Id. at 171 (quoting Sac & Fox, 307 N.L.R.B. at 244).
70. See, e.g., Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 505 (1976).
71. Richard, supra note 6, at 213-14; see also Greene, supra note 32, at 93 ("Following the
passage of IGRA, confusion surrounding its interpretation led to initial court decisions favorable
to tribes . . . .").
72. 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1192 (quoting COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982), quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)).
75. Id. at 1192 & n.6 (citing Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959)).
76. Id. at 1192-93.
77. Id. at 1200.
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sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction.', 8  Thus,
extending a federal law to those activities would impermissibly interfere with
the tribe's governmental functions.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit found in a case involving an employment
dispute between a tribe and a member employee that "[s]ubjecting such an
employment relationship . . . to federal control and supervision dilutes the
sovereignty of the tribe" and "interferes with an intramural matter that has
traditionally been left to the tribe's self-government."" Although the court did
not address the situation of a dispute between a tribe and a non-member
employee, the language of the decision suggests it would find that to be a
matter of self-government as well. The employee was working in a tribal
construction company, so the court's ruling evinced its view that tribal acts
related to commercial enterprises can in fact be essential government activities
that are excluded from federal regulation.
The Seventh Circuit has also supported treating tribal and state activities the
same, even in this post-IGRA era. In a 1993 decision declining to apply the
Fair Labor Standards Act to Indian police,so the court said that even though the
statute, read literally, would not include the tribe in its government exceptions,
"literalists do not interpret statutes literally when doing so would produce a
result senseless in the real world. . . . A literal reading of the Fair Labor
Standards Act would create a senseless distinction between Indian police and
all other public police.""1 This analysis led the court to hold that tribal
"employees exercising governmental functions that when exercised by
employees of other governments are given special consideration by the Act,
are exempt." 82 This seems to lean in a different direction than a 1989 decision
by that court dealing with the application of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) to a tribal enterprise and finding that a statute will be
applied "not simply whenever it merely affects self-governance as broadly
conceived," but rather that the governmental protection covers a narrower
realm of activity 8 3 -an approach similar to that conceived by the Ninth Circuit
in Coeur d'Alene.
78. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
79. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co.,
986 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1998).
80. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490,495 (7th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 494.
82. Id. at 495.
83. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).
182 [Vol. 34
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4. Acts of Congress Help Further the Exclusion
The Pension Protection Act and the Tribal Government Tax Status Act have
further helped to solidify the distinction of the commercial-activities category,
although those statutes purport to draw different lines. The Pension Protection
Act, which was signed into law on August 17, 2 0 06 ,' specifically references
tribal casinos in its Committee Report.8 ' Tribal government plans are included
within the term "governmental plan," but only under certain circumstances. 6
To be included as a governmental plan, the Act requires that (1) the plan is
established by a tribal government and (2) all participants are "qualified
employees," which means an employee "all of whose services as such an
employee are in the performance of essential government functions but not in
the performance of commercial activities (whether or not an essential
government function)."87 The Committee Report explains that this would
include a tribal government plan where all participants are teachers, but not
one with employees working at a hotel, casino, or marina."
The Tribal Government Tax Status Act additionally provides that "[a]n
Indian tribal government shall be treated as a State"" for certain purposes and
includes provisions for tax-free bonds and exemption from excise taxes."o The
Act then adds "additional requirements" that for excise-tax exemptions "the
transaction involves the exercise of an essential governmental function of the
Indian tribal government"' and that for tax-exempt bonds the proceeds of the
venture must be used "in the exercise of any essential government function."92
The Act uses a potentially expansive "government-functions" definition,
saying that "[flor purposes of this section, the term 'essential governmental
function' shall not include any function which is not customarily performed
by State and local governments with general taxing powers." Additionally,
the Act, at its inception in 1982, "attempted to treat tribal governments equally
84. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
85. JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28,2006, AND AS CONSIDERED
BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, JCX-38-06, at Title IX, at 244 (2006).
86. Id.
87. Pension Protection Act § 906(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 1051 (emphasis added).
88. JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at Title IX, at 244.
89. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, 26 U.S.C. § 787 1(a) (2006).
90. Id. § 7871(b).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 7871(c)(1).
93. Id. § 7871(e).
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to state and local governments for certain tax purposes."94 The way the Act
has been enforced, however, has narrowed that definition beyond what is
suggested by the Act, leaving tribes uncertain as to their abilities to finance
commercial activities.95
C. The NLRB and the D.C. Circuit Move to Cement the Distinction
Two recent cases dealing with the NLRB's jurisdiction over tribal gaming
have made the final jump toward solidifying the categorization of commercial
activities as non-governmental. These cases are built on the Ninth Circuit's
approach, to take an aggressive stance against tribal gaming activities. Taken
together, these decisions have created a legal environment hostile to Indian
gaming enterprises, and one in which tribes are now cautious in insisting on
being treated like other government entities in their activities.
In San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, the NLRB reversed its own
precedent and found that the NLRA applied on tribal reservations." The
Board acknowledged that in the past it had declined to apply the NLRA by
relying on the "principle that the location of the enterprise was pivotal,"" but
now found instead that because "tribal businesses have grown and
prospered,"" its original premise was "faulty" and thus required a "new
approach."" Under this new approach, the Board found that because the
activities were commercial in nature, they did not "concern critical internal
matters of self-governance," and thus the Tuscarora presumption applied to
extend the scope of the statute to the Tribe."*
In reaching this decision, "the NLRB has wholly abandoned its own
precedents."o' The Board went from treating tribes as sovereign entities
whose commercial activity "'is essentially governmental activity, as the
activity is undertaken to fund the sovereign itself'"' 02 to now treating tribal
94. ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & Gov'T ENTrIES, TRIBAL ADVICE & GUIDANCE
PoucY 11-8(2004), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/actrpt3_part2.pdf[hereinafter
TRIBAL ADVICE & GUIDANCE PoucY].
95. See Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on
Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1045-52 (2007).
96. 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1057 (2004).
97. Id. (citing Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp., 328 N.L.R.B. 761 (1999)).
98. Id. at 1056.
99. Id. at 1057.
100. Id. at 1061.
101. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 168.
102. Id. (quoting Vicki J. Limas, Application ofFederal Labor andEmployment Statutes to




employers like other private-sector employers in commercial operations,
stating that "the operation of a casino ... can hardly be described as 'vital' to
the tribes' ability to govern themselves or as an 'essential attribute' of their
sovereignty."'o
The Tribe appealed the NLRB decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.'"
The court found the "strongly commercial"'o nature of the operation to be key,
stating that "we use the term 'governmental' in a restrictive sense to
distinguish between the traditional acts governments perform and collateral
activities that, though perhaps in some way related to the foregoing, lie outside
their scope.""o' Using this narrow definition of government functions, the
court said, "[t]he determinative consideration appears to be the extent to which
application of the general law will constrain the tribe with respect to its
governmental functions."1o The court acknowledged that the casino funds
tribal government programs and that it had made a substantial contribution to
the welfare of a tribe that otherwise had no resources and had long depended
on federal assistance.' Nevertheless, the court still found that "the Tribe's
activity was primarily commercial"'" and therefore not governmental.
The NLRB soon reinforced San Manuel in another case where it found that
the San Manuel decision mandates Board jurisdiction over Foxwoods Resort
Casino, which is operated by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe."o The Board
noted that "approximately 98% of the Tribe's revenues are derived from the
operation of Foxwoods, which is used to fund various endeavors aimed toward
promoting the Tribal community and Tribal self-government."," But the
petitioner in the case, a labor union had framed the issue as "whether the
L.J. 681 (1999)).
103. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1061. The NLRB decision borrows the phrase "essential
attribute" from Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); the word "vital"
is taken from Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
104. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d 1306, 1318-
19 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
105. Id. at 1310.
106. Id. at 1313.
10 7. Id.
108. Id. at 1308.
109. Id. at 1315 (stating also that "the casino at issue here is virtually identical to scores of
purely commercial casinos across the country").
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casino is a commercial enterprise."" 2  The Board agreed with that
characterization, finding that jurisdiction was warranted because "Foxwoods
is an exclusively commercial venture generating enormous income for the
Tribe almost exclusively from the general public who are not tribal
members[,] . . . competes in the same commercial arena with other non-tribal
casinos, overwhelmingly employs non-tribal members, and actively
markets ... to the general public."" 3
These two decisions have sent a clear message that profitable tribal
activities-gaming in particular-will no longer be protected as part of the
governmental-activities sphere. And the tribes have heard this message.
Recently, in a union bid to organize at a casino on the Saginaw Chippewa
reservation in Michigan, the tribe allowed an NLRB-overseen union vote
without argument, assuming that the San Manuel and Foxwoods decisions
made it certain that the NLRA applied to it and thus probably trying to avoid
an ostensibly unwinnable legal battle."4 The result was not favorable to the
union-the housekeepers voted against unionizing, and the security guards
decided to drop the vote for unexplained reasons"'-but the tribe's decision
not to contest NLRB jurisdiction shows the strength of the San Manuel and
Foxwoods decisions in limiting this area of tribal sovereignty.
II. Antipathy Toward Indian Gaming Is the Most Likely Explanation for the
New Distinction
The one factor persistent at every stage of the narrowing of the
governmental-activities sphere is antipathy toward Indian gaming. We can see
this lurking beneath the surface in the Pension Protection Act and in the way
the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act has been applied, in the courts'
application of general statutes to tribal governments, and especially in the
language of the San Manuel and Foxwoods decisions.
This Part argues that the mutation of the governmental-functions definition
has been enabled by, and in significant part resulted from, the growing
opposition to Indian gaming enterprises. Section H-A observes that the new
definition imposes severe limitations on tribes that do not likewise burden
112. Transcript ofRecord at 162, Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230 (N.L.R.B. Oct.
24, 2007) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript].
113. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, at 13.
114. Mark Ranzenberger, Tribal Security Workers Drop Union Vote, MORNING SUN (Mt.






states and argues that this discrepancy is illogical because economic activities
are in fact more essential for tribes than for states. Section II-B then tracks the
rise in opposition to Indian gaming post-IGRA, a hostility driven both by
competitive concerns and general perceptions about the tribes and gaming.
Section II-C identifies this background in the language of the decisions and
statutes that have contributed to the mutation, suggesting that this atmosphere
of antipathy formed a backdrop enabling those decisions. Finally, Section II-D
reinforces this conclusion by arguing that the encroachment into tribal self-
government lacks any Supreme Court or congressional impetus.
A. The Governmental-Commercial Distinction Subjects Tribal Government
Activities to Debilitating Limitations Not Imposed on States
1. Many Tribal Activities Are Excluded Where State Activities Are
Included
Although states frequently operate lotteries and other commercial
endeavors,"' these activities are not targeted as being "non-governmental" in
the same way that such endeavors are for tribes."' For example, state
government employers are exempt from ERISA under the "governmental
plan" exception."' But even before the Pension Protection Act, the Ninth
Circuit had stated that tribes were not included in this exemption because the
application of ERISA would not interfere with self-governance." 9 These
decisions thus treated tribes differently from states under the same definition
when there was no statutory basis for the distinction. Now, with the passage
of the Act, this difference in treatment has been codified. The Pension
Protection Act explicitly singles out tribes for treatment different from that
given to states.120
116. States collected more than $17 billion in profits from lottery tickets in 2008. North Am.
Ass'n of State & Provincial Lotteries, Sales and Profits, http://www.naspl.org/index.cfm?fuse
action=content&PageID=3&PageCategory-3 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). The twelve states
with commercial casinos did even better, with ten ofthose states achieving gross revenues in the
billions. Am. Gaming Ass'n, Industry Information, http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/
state/statistics.cfn?stateid=8888 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
117. See, e.g., TRIBAL ADVICE & GUIDANCE POLICY, supra note 94; Clarkson, supra note
95, at 1073 (noting that the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act differentiates tribes from
states).
118. See Kristin E. Burge, Comment,ERISA andIndian Tribes:AlternativeApproachesfor
Respecting Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 1291, 1294.
119. Id. at 1293 (describing Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods.
Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1991)).
120. See Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified at 26
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The tax-exempt-bonds context presents a further example. Although tribal
use of tax-exempt bonds for commercial activities is prohibited, "non-tribal
governments have issued billions of dollars in tax-exempt bonds to finance
hotels and convention centers."l 2' In fact, Professor Clarkson notes in his
article on tribal finance barriers that an IRS issuance advised against litigating
a case where it had refused to allow tax-exempt bonds for a tribal golf course
"because it would 'be difficult to argue that [a] Golf Course is so commercial
in nature that state and local governments would not own and operate similar
enterprises."'l 22
The most prominent modern example is the recent application of the NLRA
to the tribes, discussed supra,123 making "tribal governments ... the only
governments in the United States subject to the NLRA." 24 These decisions
create a situation where "[e]mployees of a state health care organization would
not be able to sue the state for breaches of the NLRA or the FLSA, but tribal
employees can sue their employer."'25 In this atmosphere, "courts are forced
to distinguish tribal activities, but not state activities, regardless of whether the
employment offered by the state is governmental in nature or solely
commercial. This difference in treatment between states and tribes is incorrect
logic."l26
U.S.C. § 414(d)) (including tribal plans as "governmental plans" only under certain
circumstances); see also Burge, supra note 118, at 1300 (stating that "[a]pplication of ERISA
to tribal employers infringes on tribal sovereignty and paternalistically impedes progress toward
tribal self-sufficiency").
121. Clarkson, supra note 95, at 1055; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT &GOV'T
ENTrIEs, SURVEY AND REVIEW OF EXISTING INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOR INDIAN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS 12 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/p4344.pdf [hereinafter
SURVEY& REVIEW] (explaining that "while states and cities routinely issue tax-exempt debt for
hotels and convention facilities," tribes have been obstructed in their efforts to do the same).
122. Clarkson, supra note 95, at 1079 (quoting IRS Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 20,024,712, at
5 (Nov. 22, 2002)).
123. See supra Part I-C.
124. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 131.
125. Richard, supra note 6, at 219.
126. Id. at 217-18; see also id. at 218-19 ("[M]aking a distinction between governmental and
commercial tribal activities is inappropriate when states do not have to suffer the same scrutiny.
Even if courts continue to make this distinction, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 'self-
government' has reduced its practical application."). The Seventh Circuit agreed with this view
in one case, pointing out that "the difference in treatment between these tribal law enforcement
officers and state or local policemen makes no sense." Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish &




2. Gaming Is Essential to Tribal Self-Government
A distinction that refuses to classify tribal commercial activities as protected
government functions is illogical because these activities-gaming in
particular-are truly essential for tribal governments in a way that they are not
for state or local governments. For example, Foxwoods Resort Casino
generates between ninety-eight and ninety-nine percent of the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe's total revenue.'27 Many tribes lack other revenue sources to
fund their governmental activities, and tribal commercial enterprises and
government services are closely linked. "Tribal businesses are established not
only for profit, but predominantly for the benefit of the tribal government and
members."l2 8
Tribal tax bases are generally quite small, and "[a]s a result, the income
generated from taxation is insufficient to perform necessary governmental
functions." 2 9 In addition, "[flederal funding is an extremely unreliable source
of revenue for tribal government. And yet the unmet need for tribal
government service projects approached $60 billion a year by the turn of the
century.""' Given this, "[s]ubstantial economic development in Indian
country will not occur without significant infusions of outside capital.""'
The U.S. Supreme Court in Cabazon acknowledged this reality, stating that
"[t]he tribal games at present provide the sole source of revenues for the
operation of the tribal governments. . . . Self-determination and economic
development are not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and
provide employment for their members."' 3 2 Tribal government revenue-
raising can take different forms depending on the particular needs and strategy
of a tribe."' Regardless of the form taken, "[p]romoting economic
127. Hearing Transcript, supra note 112, at 48.
128. Richard, supra note 6, at 219; see also SURvEY & REvIEw, supra note 121, at 10
("Excess revenues from tribal business operations are a critical source of funding for tribal
governmental programs. . . . [T]ribal governments are the primary engine for economic
development in Indian country .... .").
129. Burge, supra note 118, at 1317; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal
Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759
(2004). "Tribal governments have extreme difficulty in raising revenue; they have virtually no
tax base." Id. at 771. "Indian tribes have little resort except to pursue an alternative method
of raising revenue: economic development." Id. at 774.
130. Fletcher, supra note 129, at 774-75.
131. Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 3
(2008).
132. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1987).
133. Fletcher, supra note 129, at 775 ("In operating business, Indian tribes must choose
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development is a traditional and long accepted governmental function, and
there is no principled way of distinguishing it from the other public purposes
the Court has recognized."' 34
This lack of other sources of government funding led to the development
of tribal gaming enterprises."' Gaming has provided vital economic
development for tribes. Once reservation gaming began to expand,
"[u]nemployment on reservations with gaming fell by five percent, while
unemployment on non-gaming reservations decreased by half that amount." 3 6
Indian family poverty has also decreased since the development of reservation
gaming enterprises."' Tribal gaming enterprises need the same protection as
other government services because it is necessary to tribal survival that these
enterprises be able to operate competitively. "Tribes are generally smaller
employers and frequently lose potential employees because other entities are
able to offer much better benefits.""' Additionally, revenue from gaming can
be spent only on the provision of government services, aiding local
governmental agencies, or donations to charitable organizations.'3 1
The "purely intramural" Coeur d'Alene standard is problematic because it
excludes these essential activities. The standard as it applies "conceives of
between several directions: whether to use the business as a revenue generator to pay for tribal
government services; whether to use the business as a job creation mechanism for tribal
members; simply whether to seek profit for its members ... or a combination of any of the
above.").
134. Clarkson, supra note 95, at 1061 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
470 (2005) (syllabus)); see also TRIBAL ADVICE & GUIDANCE POLICY, supra note 94, at 11-3
("The federal government's failure to understand and accommodate the developmental status
of many tribal economies in defining 'essential government function' . . . discourages the
development and acquisition of the most basic elements of infrastructure taken for granted off
the reservation, but so lacking and desperately needed by many tribal communities .... ).
135. See McClatchey, supra note 17, at 142 ("Indian gaming arose from the desperate need
to fund tribal operations from a 'homegrown' source, rather than the erratic funding from the
[Bureau of Indian Affairs].").
136. Id. at 144.
137. Id.
138. H. BILL REP., 60-5640, 1st Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2007), available at http://apps.leg.wa.
gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/5640.HBR.pdf. The Act"allows
tribal governments to participate in the Public Employees Benefits Board programs under the
same conditions and requirements as counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions."
Id. at 1. The Act's goal is to "treat[] tribes like other government entitities." Id at 3; see also
McClatchey, supra note 17, at 165 ("The strong tribal interest in obtaining revenue with which
to provide for the health, welfare and security of the tribe is implicated in the ability of the tribe
to regulate its own labor market, free from federal or state control.").




tribes as isolated units comprised exclusively of members. In reality, non-
members participate in nearly all aspects of tribal life."' 40 This conception
proves very limiting, and "[i]f more courts require the exclusive involvement
of tribal members before finding that tribal conduct is 'purely intramural,' the
standard will rarely, if ever, apply."'41
B. Attitudes Toward Indian Gaming Have Grown Less Favorable Since the
Passage ofIGRA
Between 1988 and 1996, casinos expanded their presence from two states
to twenty-four,142 and that number has continued to grow. There are now
casinos in forty-eight states,143 with tribally owned casinos in twenty-nine of
those states.'" This rapid expansion has fueled negative attitudes toward
gambling in generall4 5-and Indian gaming in particular.146 Those concerns
particular to Indian gaming are driven by fear of unfair competition, of the
140. Singel, supra note 12, at 714; see also Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751
F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying in part on the fact that the Farm employed non-Indians
in its decision that federal regulation of the Farm did not implicate essential government
functions).
141. Singel, supra note 12, at 715.
142. Margot Homblower, No Dice: The Backlash Against Gambling, TIME, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 28.
143. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 1-1 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/1.pdf
144. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, List and Location of Tribal Gaming Operations, http:/
www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/ListandLocationofTribalGamingOperations/tabid/68/Default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 14, 2009).
145. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., GAMBLING: AS THE TAKE RISES, So DOES PUBUC CONCERN
(May 23, 2006), http://pewresearch.orglassets/social/pdflGambling.pdf (showing that in 2006
seventy percent of Americans believe legalized gambling encourages people to gamble more
than they can afford, up from sixty-two percent in 1989); see also Richard L. Worsnop,
Gambling Under Attack: How Serious Is the Current Backlash?, 6 CQ RESEARCHER 769, 772-
73 (1996) (describing how intense anti-gaming backlash as a result of the industry's expansion
and success has led to failure of gaming-legalization laws in thirty-three of thirty-five state
efforts).
146. See Davis & Hudman, supra note 30, at 89-91; see also Barbara A. Carmichael &
Donald M. Peppard, Jr., The Impacts ofFoxwoods Resort Casino on Its Dual Host Community,
in TOURISM AND GAMING ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 128, 143 (Alan A. Lew & George A.
Van Otten eds., 1998) (finding that in the community surrounding Foxwoods casino in
Connecticut, "[t]o the extent attitudes toward the tribe have changed, they have tended to
worsen, despite the economic benefits and partnership opportunities."); Worsnop, supra note
145, at 3 (noting that some conservatives have been anti-gaming, with one prominent columnist
describing the "gambling racket ... on glitzy reservations of phony Indian tribes" (quoting
William Safire, New Evil Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 1995, at A27).
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political power that comes with economic success, and by resentment of the
success of a small population that often does not seem very "Indian."
Competitive concerns lie at the heart of much of the objection to Indian
gaming. Several courts and state officials have expressed a "concern ... that,
in their commercial dealings, tribes will be able to unfairly compete with
commercial, non-state actors if they are not subject to federal labor law as the
non-state actors are."l 47 This fear is unfounded, though, because "tribes do
not, and cannot, compete with commercial gaming operators. . . . IGRA
requires tribes to expend their profits on governmental needs." 48 An
additional, related concern of states is that casinos take money away from local
businesses and channel it to the reservation. 149 The State is left without the
economic benefits but with most of the social costs (in terms of its residents'
gambling debts and related problems such as bankruptcy and fraud), while the
Tribe receives all of the financial rewards. When it comes time to pay the
costs, the non-Indian gambler has left the reservation."o
Another concern fueling the backlash against Indian gaming is the non-
"Indian" nature of these enterprises. In a study polling attitudes toward the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe since the opening of Foxwoods, researchers noted
comments to the effect that tribes are not "real Indians" because they are not
impoverished.' 5 ' The researchers observed that "some local residents seem to
resent [the tribe's] success with comments like 'I think there are a number of
people with little Indian blood getting all the money' and 'They are not real
Indians, they are wealthy."'l 52 Columnists and political figures have expressed
147. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 187; see also Davis & Hudman, supra note 30, at 90
(noting that competition is intensifying between tribal enterprises and state and local
governments as well as other non-tribal gaming enterprises).
148. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 187.
149. See Eve Baron, Casino Gambling and the Polarization of American Indian
Reservations, in TouRIsM AND GAMING ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 163, 164 (Alan A. Lew
& George A. Van Otten eds., 1998) ("As a result ofcasino gambling, some reservations are now
in the position of posing a threat to the surrounding states' accumulation of revenue... . [T]his
emerging era may ... come to be defined by a new collective approach to American Indian
political and economic autonomy.").
150. See Melynda D. Wilcox, Gambling: More States Are Folding, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL
FIN. MAG., July 1996, at 14, 14; see also Carmichael & Peppard, supra note 146, at 138-39
(survey respondents expressed idea "that Indians have an unfair status and make no tax
contributions from their successes").
151. Carmichael & Peppard, supra note 146, at 141-42.
152. Id.; see also Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense ofAnti-Indian Racism: Reactions
to Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgement, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY




similar sentiments, referring to "phony Indian tribes""s3 in what has become
known as "rich Indian racism."l54 In this way, anti-casino voices appeal to
shared cultural images of "Indianness" to gain support for their cause.
C. Language in Cases and Acts Suggests This Underlying Concern
The popular opposition to Indian gaming enterprises sets a backdrop for the
court decisions addressing tribal commercial activities as government
functions. There is evidence of this atmosphere in the language of the
congressional acts and some of the decisions that helped to splinter-off
commercial activities from the governmental-functions sphere.
The Committee Report to the Pension Protection Act explicitly
acknowledges that the Act separates out commercial activities for the purpose
of not including gaming operations in the governmental-plan exception to
ERISA."' Additionally, the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act, in the
way it has been enforced, reveals a concern with tribal profits from
commercial enterprises. One IRS tax-exempt-bond-enforcement-program
officer, in discussing the commercial nature of a tribal golf course, said "I
don't think Congress ever anticipated several dozen people getting six-figure
checks due to a resort financed by tax-exempt bonds.""' This concern is
surprising, "[g]iven the level of 'commercial' activity funded with tax-exempt
debt by states and local governments.""'
Antipathy toward profitable tribal enterprises-especially gaming-can also
be discerned in the cases extending federal statutes to the tribes. In a 1991
Ninth Circuit case applying OSHA to a tribal timber mill, the court made sure
to mention that the business had $33.5 million in sales.15 9 While this was not
taken the form, primarily, of racialized attacks on the Mashantucket Pequot's Indian identity.").
153. Worsnop, supra note 145, at 3 (quoting Safire, supra note 146).
154. See, e.g., RENEE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLORS AND COLONIALISM 105 (2005). "Rich
Indian racism" is the prevalent racial stereotype that "equat[es] indigeneity with primitivism and
poverty" and thus backlashes against wealthy, and therefore empowered, Indians. Id. at 109.
155. Cramer, supra note 152, at 328-30. "[Sjpecific ideas about Indian physical traits, social
class, and culture constitute the dominant understandings of Indianness at play in much
anticasino rhetoric." Id. at 328.
156. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at Title IX, at 244.
157. Clarkson, supra note 95, at 1074 (quoting Alison L. McConnell, Bond Lawyers: IRS
Out ofOrder on Tribal Financings, BOND BUYER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 5, available at 2005 WLNR
18127583 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 1073-82 (discussing "the arguably
racist heritage of the essential government function test," id. at 1081).
158. Id. at 1083.
159. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182,
183 (9th Cir. 1991).
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a casino case, tribal gaming was well-developed by 1991 and certainly a
specter in the background of these types of cases. 0 This case is in keeping
with the theme that when tribes make money, they are no longer acting as
governments. The Second Circuit also hinted at the influence of this backdrop
when it highlighted the fact that the tribal construction company at issue in a
case did much of its work on a casino-expansion project and then proceeded
to find that the construction activity was non-governmental."
The most visible examples of the connection between the narrowing tribal-
government-functions definition and anti-gaming sentiment are in the language
of San Manuel and the most recent NLRB decisions. Both the San Manuel
and Foxwoods decisions reflect a concern with the profitability of casinos for
the respective tribes, and where they fail to find support in precedent or
congressional intent, the court and Board march out these facts. 62 This has led
some commentators to suggest that these cases have arisen because organized
labor is focusing on tribal employers, "banking (probably implicitly) on the
themes of fear, mistrust, and broadly accepted racism that linger just beneath
the surface of the Indian gaming debate."' 6
The NLRB acknowledged in San Manuel that the "increasingly important
role" of tribal commercial enterprises played a part in its decision to reverse
its longstanding approach and apply the NLRA to the tribes.'6" The Board
twice pointed out that these enterprises have become "serious competitors with
non-Indian owned businesses."'6  The D.C. Circuit as well, in finding that
tribal gaming is not "traditional," made a point to note the economic success
of the casino at issue.166 In that case, one commentator argues that
[p]art of the basis for the decision was that tribal commercial
activity simply does not fit the model of traditional tribal
functions.... The notion that a tribe can have commercial dealings
160. See Worsnop, supra note 145, at 772-73.
161. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 1996). This same
sentiment is reflected in an Eleventh Circuit case, where the court found a restaurant and
gaming facility to be non-governmental in part because "the Tribe intends to profit" from the
operation. Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999).
162. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d 1306,
1308 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, at 13 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 24,
2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Regional%20Decisions/2007/34-RC-22
30%2010-24-07.pdf (referring to tribe's "enormous income").
163. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 133.
164. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1056 (2004).
165. Id. at 1056, 1062.




while retaining sovereignty appears foreign to the NLRB, despite
the fact that states engage in commercial dealings every day
without losing an iota of their sovereignty."'
Likewise, the Board in Foxwoods mentioned several times the profitability
of the casino for the tribe in the context of explaining why the tribe could
afford to have unions in the casino.' That fact seemed to influence the
decision heavily despite it being unrelated to whether financing the
government is a function of tribal self-government.' 69 In addition to the profit
factor, the NLRB in Foxwoods seemed to take a narrow view of the sphere of
"traditional" government activities, noting that no "traditional games" are
played at Foxwoods."o These decisions are "forcing tribes to conform to the
court's vision of legitimate tribal self-government.""'
D. The Governmental-Commercial Distinction Is Not Otherwise Supported
by Congressional Intent or Supreme Court Decisions
There is no expression of congressional intent or Supreme Court decision
suggesting the exclusion of commercial enterprises from the realm of tribal
governmental activities. This further supports the conclusion that the
distinction was spurred and enabled by antipathy to Indian gaming. In fact,
Congress and the Supreme Court have both consistently affirmed that
economic enterprises are vital to tribal self-government, which suggests
inclusion in the governmental-activities category.
Congress has never expressed support for the narrowing of the self-
government sphere.'72 "On the contrary, the current congressional policy
toward Indian tribes promotes tribal self-determination and recognizes that
economic development is essential to this aim.""7 3 Congress has repeatedly
expressed an interest in forwarding tribal development,174 and "tribes cannot
167. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 185; see also San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315
("[O]peration of a casino is not a traditional attribute of self-government.").




170. Id. at 3.
171. Singel, supra note 12, at 713.
172. See Burge, supra note 118, at 1308 (noting that the "determination of congressional
intent ... was noticeably sidestepped by the court in assuming the applicability of general laws,
such as ERISA, to tribes").
173. Singel, supra note 12, at 701.
174. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2006).
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strive toward that goal if their governmental revenues are constrained by
burdensome and onerous federal labor regulation.""'
The Pension Protection Act is no exception. Although the Act did separate
out the commercial category, and that separation may have helped to create an
atmosphere in which courts like the D.C. Circuit in San Manuel and the NLRB
in Foxwoods felt comfortable making this distinction, the explicit exception
in the Pension Protection Act in fact supports maintaining the traditional
definition. By clarifying that the exception in the Act does not extend to
commercial activities, "whether or not such activities are an essential
government function,""' Congress is in fact saying that commercial activities
can be essential government functions, but that in this particular instance they
are excluded anyway.
Supreme Court precedent also does not drive the governmental-commercial
distinction. The Ninth Circuit (and the courts that have recently joined its
analysis) used Tuscarora as a jumping-off point for their narrowed definition,
but that case does not in any way advocate the exclusion of commercial
enterprises from the sphere of tribal government functions. The Court in
Tuscarora said in dicta that a general applicability statute applies to Indian
tribes and members."' It did not discuss which tribal governmental activities
would be excluded from this presumption, and it certainly did not suggest the
Ninth Circuit's "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters" standard or any of the restrictive interpretations of that standard that
have followed. The intramural-matters exception, designed by the Ninth
Circuit and subsequently narrowed by it and other courts, both draws a
different line than does Tuscarora and invites subjective decision-making by
courts.178
Other Supreme Court precedent points against a commercial-activities
exception to essential government functions."' The Court has consistently
treated commercial activities as vital to the maintenance of tribal governments.
As noted supra,so in Cabazon the Court affirmed gaming as an expression of
175. McClatchey, supra note 17, at 167.
176. JoiNT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85.
177. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
178. See Singel, supra note 12, at 712-13.
179. For a discussion of Coeur d'Alene's inconsistency with Supreme Court jurisprudence
applying the Indian law canons of construction, see generally Bryan 14. Wildenthal, How the
Ninth Circuit Overruled a Century ofSupreme Court Indian Jurisprudence-and Has So Far
Gotten Away with It, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 547.
180. See supra Part I-A.
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tribal sovereignty."' In LaPlante as well, the Court noted that "[t]ribal
authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation land is an important
part of tribal sovereignty." 82 In finding that even regulation of non-members
was key to sovereignty, the Court supported the idea that activities involving
such regulation, including gaming, are also connected to government.
Further, in the taxation context, the Court has affirmed tribes' inherent
powers to tax activities occurring on the reservation as an "essential attribute
of Indian sovereignty" and "a necessary instrument of self-government and
territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise
revenues for its essential services."' 8 3 The Court noted that "Congress has
expressed the purpose of 'fostering tribal self-government"'" and that "' [i]t
simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal
functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise
at least minimal taxing powers . . . ."'" A clear analogy can be drawn
between this affirmation of the power to tax in order to raise revenues for
government services and tribal operation of commercial enterprises for the
same purpose. If funding government services is an essential government
function in one context, it should be in the other. In the absence of
superseding precedent by the Court, these decisions exhibit the Court's
approach to gaming and tribal economic enterprises. Tuscarora did not disturb
this tradition.'"'
III. Courts Must Act to Correct This Faulty Distinction
This Part argues there is still time to retum the tribal-government-functions
standard to its original meaning and eliminate the uncertainty and wide
181. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987).
182. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
183. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
184. Id. at 138 n.5 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980)); see also LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 14 ("We have repeatedly
recognized the Federal Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-
government.").
185. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 550 (10th Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (McKay, J., concurring), ajJd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)).
186. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d 1306,
1311 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the Tuscarora "rule" is "in tension with ... longstanding
principles"). For an in-depth discussion of how San Manuel represents a departure from the
Indian Law canons of construction and Supreme Court precedent, see generally Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR.
L. REv. 413 (2007).
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discretion facing courts dealing with tribal-self-government questions. Section
III-A explains how the current climate has led courts to decide these cases
haphazardly based on their own subjective notions of which government
activities fit the new definition. Section III-B suggests that ongoing and future
unionization disputes may present an opportunity for courts to reverse the
trend and authoritatively return the definition to one that is consistent with that
applied to states and to require a congressional statement before removing
commercial activities from the government-functions sphere in a given case.
A. Under the New Formulations Courts Are Left with Little Guidance in
Deciding Government-Functions Cases
Both the "attributes of self-government" and "purely intramural matters"
standards provide little explanation of what those categories involve.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Coeur d'Alene standard, even if it were clear,
is not binding precedent on other circuits. The collection of haphazard
decisions shows that in this current climate, courts feel free to choose on their
own whim whether to respect a certain tribal government activity. Courts ask
if the activity fits the "portrait of an Indian tribe exercising exclusive rights of
self-governance in purely intramural matters,""' and this consideration can
lead to subjective decisions influenced by attitudes about Indian gaming. "The
opinions that apply [the intramural matters] standard have failed to interpret
the meaning of this phrase, and have instead made conclusory statements that
the tribal operation of businesses affecting interstate commerce are [sic] not
essential to tribal self-government."'" The Ninth Circuit standard "invites the
courts to determine the essential ingredients of tribal sovereignty on an ad hoc,
'I know it when I see it' basis."' 89
The need for an articulable standard that can provide some consistency is
apparent, and the most logical standard would be a return to the test as used for
states. The IRS Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities
has called for regulations implementing just such a definition in order to
reduce this high level of uncertainty.O Although "[t]he clearest and simplest
reform" would be for Congress to include the tribes explicitly when listing
187. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 1996).
188. Singel, supra note 12, at 713.
189. Id. at 717.
190. TRIBAL ADVICE & GUIDANCE PoucY, supra note 94, at II-12; SURVEY & REVIEW,




exempt government entities in statutes"' and to clarify what those exemptions
mean, Congress for the most part has avoided taking a stance in the debate.'9 2
Members of Congress did attempt to fix the problem in several instances.
In the NLRA context, members have several times proposed tribal labor acts
that would exclude tribal governments from application of the NLRA,' but
so far these have failed to become law. Most recent is the Tribal Labor
Sovereignty Act of 2009, currently in the House Subcommittee on Health,
Employment, Labor, and Pensions.'94
Additionally, the proposed Tribal Tax Exempt Bond Parity Act of 2007
attempted to resolve the disparity between tribes and states by defining
"4essential government function" in the Act to "includ[e] any function which
is performed by a State or local government."' Much of the language
proposed in 2007 was used in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax
Act of 2009 in amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow for tax-exempt
Tribal Economic Development Bonds, which are treated "in the same manner
as if such bond were issued by a State."'" Financing of gaming facilities,
however, is excluded from the Amendment.' Despite these efforts, the courts
cannot wait for Congress to amend every statute to exclude tribal enterprises,
and Congress should not have to provide these new explicit statements of
exclusion when until recently it was assumed that, without an explicit
statement to the contrary, Indian tribes would be excluded from statutes that
affect their sovereignty.
B. Current Cases May Present an Opportunity to Correct the Problem
In the absence of congressional action, courts need to apply a consistent
definition in determining when tribes are acting to provide an essential
government service and resist the urge to examine the wealth of a tribe or ask
why they have departed so far from "Indian" activities. The recent push by
unions to organize reservation workers may present the most likely
opportunity for this-in particular, the potential ongoing controversies
surrounding unionization ofworkers on the Mashantucket Pequot and Saginaw
Chippewa reservations.
191. See McClatchey, supra note 17, at 183.
192. See id. at 174 (stating that "[m]any of the most progressive acts of Congress with regard
to Indian tribes have doggedly pursued avoidance as a method ofdealing with tribal problems").
193. See H.R. 3413, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 16, 109th Cong. (2005).
194. H.R. 1395, 111th Cong. (2009).
195. S. 1850, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
196. 26 U.S.C.S. §7871(f)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2009).
197. Id. § 7871(f)(3)(B)(i).
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The Foxwoods unionization case, if controversies continue, could present
an excellent opportunity to stop this governmental-commercial distinction
from solidifying, thus returning to a standard more supported by the case law
and congressional intent. After the initial finding against the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, the NLRB rejected the Tribe's request for review on November
21, 2007.'9 While San Manuel could have been a fact-specific fluke, with
Foxwoods the NLRB seemed to be pushing to take the final step and make the
limited-government-functions sphere the rule. The Tribe had indicated it
would appeal the decision to the federal courts, 199 but that appeal was
abandoned when the tribe and the United Auto Workers reached an agreement
in October 2008 to negotiate a union contract under tribal law.200
Nevertheless, neither party gave up its rights under federal law. If further
controversies arise relating to unionization on this reservation and the Tribe
does take the case to the appellate courts, those courts will have the
opportunity to re-affirm the long-established and traditional concept of tribal
government functions.
The unionizing attempts on the Saginaw Chippewa reservation also might
present an opportunity for halting the NLRB's push to make the distinction
permanent. Although the Tribe did not object to allowing NLRB oversight of
the union election,20 ' it afterward adopted an ordinance prohibiting union-
organizing on the reservation.202 The law was repealed by the Tribe, however,
after the Teamsters Union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge.203 Still, if the
unions make another attempt, the Tribe has indicated it is committed to
fighting the jurisdiction issue.2 04 This would open up another opportunity for
198. Order Denying Request for Review, Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230
(N.L.R.B. Nov. 21,2007), available athttp://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/portal/nlrb.pt?open=512&objlD=
201&mode=2&inhiuserid=201&cached-true (search for"Foxwoods"; then follow hyperlink
34-RC-2230 (2) under "Case" column) (last visited Dec. 14, 2009).
199. Michael J. Thomas, Op-Ed., Balancing the Rights of Workers, Tribe, THE DAY (New
London, Conn.), Dec. 16, 2007, at E3.
200. See Breaking News: UAW/Foxwoods - "Historic" Agreement Reached to Negotiate
Contract Under Tribal Law, posting to Connecticut Employment Law Blog, http://www.
ctemploymentlawblog.com/tags/tribal (Oct. 31, 2008).
201. See Ranzenberger, supra note 114.
202. Gale Courey Toensing, Saginaw Chippewa Fights Federal Unions with Ban, Education,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/
archive/28409534.html.
203. Mark Ranzenberger, Tribe Repeals Union Ban, MORNING SUN (Mt. Pleasant, Mich.),
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circuit courts, and perhaps the Supreme Court, to make a statement returning
the government-functions test to its original-and logical-place.
Conclusion
Antipathy toward Indian gaming has created an atmosphere enabling the
gradual narrowing of the category of tribal government activities to exclude
economic development projects. This has allowed increasing infringements
of federal law into tribal operations. Those who would benefit from federal
regulation have perceived this opportunity and have pushed each step toward
the splintering-off of commercial activities from the governmental sphere. The
result is one built on weak or nonexistent legal theories that no court would
have accepted pre-IGRA. But there is still time to reverse the trend and return
the definition of tribal government functions to a defensible category that is
consistent with that applied to states, and as tribal economic development
continues, this issue must be resolved.
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